How's Life? Combining Individual and National Variables to Explain Subjective Well-Being by John F. Helliwell
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
HOW’S LIFE? COMBINING INDIVIDUAL AND NATIONAL








The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the National Bureau of
Economic Research.
© 2002 by John F. Helliwell.  All rights reserved.  Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may
be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.How’s Life? Combining Individual and National
Variables to Explain Subjective Well-Being
John F. Helliwell
NBER Working Paper No. 9065
July 2002
JEL No. F0, I0, Z0, J1
ABSTRACT
This paper attempts to explain international and inter-personal differences in subjective
well-being over the final fifth of the twentieth century. The empirical work makes use of data from three
waves of the World Values survey covering about fifty different countries. The analysis proceeds in
stages. First there is a brief review of some reasons for giving a key role to subjective measures of
well-being. This is followed by a survey of earlier empirical studies, a description of the main variables
used, a report of results and tests, and discussion of the links among social capital, education, income and
well-being. 
The main innovation of the paper, relative to earlier studies of subjective well-being, lies in its
use of large international samples of data combining individual and societal level variables, thus
permitting the simultaneous identification of individual-level and societal-level determinants of
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This paper attempts to explain international trends and differences in subjective well-
being over the final fifth of the twentieth century. This will be done in several stages. First there 
will be a brief review of some reasons for giving a central role to subjective measures of well-
being. This will be followed by sections containing a survey of earlier empirical studies, a 
description of the main variables used in this study, a report of results and tests, discussion of the 
links among social capital, education, and well-being, re-estimation of the final model,  and  
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2. Why Study Happiness? 
 
The idea of using self-assessments of well-being, or of life satisfaction, as a way of 
evaluating the quality of a society and its citizens goes back to Aristotle and beyond. It has been 
argued that ancient ethics “gets its grip on the individual at this point of reflection: am I satisfied 
with my life as a whole, and the way it has developed and promises to develop?” (Annas 1993, 
28). 
The Aristotelian view has central importance among ancient and modern views, in part 
because of its attempt to balance different aspects of satisfaction regarded as antithetical by 
others.  “We may define happiness as prosperity combined with excellence; or as independence  
of life, or as the secure enjoyment of the maximum of pleasure; or as a good condition for 
property and body, together with the power of guarding one’s property and body and making use 
of them. That happiness is one or more of these things, pretty well everyone agrees. From this 
definition of happiness it follows that its constituent parts are: good birth, plenty of friends, good 
friends, wealth, good children, plenty of children, a happy old age, and also such bodily 
excellences as health, beauty, strength, large stature, athletic powers, together with fame, honour, 
good luck and excellence. (Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1360b, 14-23)
2”. These are views Aristotle 
considers to be widely held. In developing his own ethical theory, Aristotle emphasizes the 
importance of a lifetime’s virtuous activity, which in turn requires a sufficient supply of external 
goods if anything is to be achieved. The material goods are a means and not an end
3. Thus “The 
                                                           
2 Unless otherwise specified, any quotations from Aristotle are drawn from the Barnes 
(1984) edition of the works of Aristotle, with page references keyed to Bekker’s standard 1831 
edition of the Greek text. 
3 For example: ‘Happiness, therefore, must be some form of contemplation. But, being a 
man, one will also need external prosperity; for our nature is not self-sufficient for the purpose of 
contemplation, but our body must also be healthy, and have food and other attention. Still, we 
must not think that the man who is to be happy will need many things or great things, merely 
because he cannot be blessed without external goods; for self-sufficiency and action do not 
depend on excess, and we can do noble acts without ruling earth and sea; for even with moderate  
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Life of money-making is one undertaken under compulsion, and wealth is evidently not the good 
we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else.” (Nicomachean Ethics 
Book 1: 1096a 6-10). The Stoics differed from Aristotle in placing their whole emphasis on the 
virtuous life, while Epicureans placed more emphasis than Aristotle on the importance of 
pleasures, including among these the avoidance of pain in body and soul (Annas 1993, 336). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
advantages one can act excellently...’ (Nicomachean Ethics Book 10: 1178b 32-35, 1179a 1-5.)  
 
When faced with such widespread views about the constituents of happiness and the 
sources of life satisfaction, Aristotle also made a strong appeal for empirical work: “We must 
therefore survey what we have already said, bringing it to the test of the facts of life, and if it 
harmonizes with the facts we must accept it, but if it clashes with them we must suppose it to be 
mere theory.” (Nicomachean Ethics, Book 10, 1179, 20-23)  
 
This paper takes up Aristotle’s challenge, as has much of the previous empirical work on 
subjective well-being, especially in psychology. Beyond the inherent interest of mapping the 
correlates of satisfaction, there are also policy-related reasons for paying attention to subjective 
measures of well-being. One is that many public policies have effects on well-being that flow 
through productivity and incomes as well as through other channels. Conventional economic 
analysis can recognize the existence of these other channels, but if the effects are generally 
positive via one channel but negative through another channel, the net effects of the policy 
cannot be evaluated unless there is some method for comparing the sizes of the offsetting effects. 
If there are ways of tracking the offsetting influences through to subjective well-being, then 
measures of their relative size may be used to support inferences about the net effects of events 
or policies under review. 
 
Finally, the large international sample of individual well-being data permits the joint  
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estimation of individual and societal-level linkages. This two-level approach is vital for 
estimating the extent to which there are external consequences of actions, attitudes, and public 
policies. For example, to what extent are effects of higher income on well-being based on 
comparisons with others in the same society? Do the benefits of living in a high-trust society 
depend on your own assessments, or also on more widely shared estimates? Do individuals gain 
satisfaction from society-wide measures of health in addition to their assessments of their own 
health? If the national as well as the individual values of variables are both included in the 
explanation of individual well-being, it is possible to show to what extent there are positive or 
negative spillover effects that could affect the evaluation of alternative policies. Since it is not 
always easy to find comparable measures at the individual and society-wide levels, and since the 
estimation of two-level effects is limited by the number of countries and years for which surveys 
are available, this paper provides illustrations rather than definitive conclusions on the existence 
and size of the key national-level factors determining well-being. 
   
3. Previous Research 
 
The study of well-being has over the past century taken a distant second place to the study 
of psychological illness. One count places the number of psychological abstracts since 1887 
mentioning anxiety as 100 times greater than those mentioning life satisfaction (Myers 2000, 56). 
Nevertheless there have been many studies of well-being accumulating over the years, and there 
is evidence of a flowering of new interest, as shown by the more than 300 articles surveyed by 
Diener et al (1999). The starting point of that survey of recent work is the earlier survey by 
Wilson (1967) of the then much more limited evidence on the constituents of happiness. 
Wilson’s list of attributes of the typical happy person has remarkable similarities to that proposed 
by Aristotle, since he attributes happiness to the “young, healthy, well-educated, well-paid, 
extroverted, optimistic, worry-free, religious married person with high self-esteem, job morale, 
modest aspirations, of either sex and a wide range of intelligence.” (Wilson 1967, 214).  
 
In the subsequent thirty years, there has been a flowering of new results, using  
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experiments, data samples and more complex statistical analysis to study partial effects, causal 
pathways and non-linearities. Experiments have shown that pleasant affect, unpleasant affect, and 
life satisfaction are separable constructs (Diener et al 1999, 277).  Since the former two are more 
responsive to short-term circumstances, much of the well-being literature has focused on 
measures of life satisfaction. The same reasoning supports the use of a measure of life 
satisfaction as the dependent variable for the empirical work in this paper.  
 
Previous well-being research has emphasized the joint importance of personality, the 
social environment and circumstances in determining levels of subjective well-being. Special 
attention has also been paid to the importance of goals and aspirations, of comparison groups, 
personal experience, and habituation as joint determinants of how changes in circumstances will 
affect individual well-being. Personality has been shown to be substantially heritable. Personality 
differences have been shown to affect self-assessments of well-being, and to influence how an 
individual responds to unfolding events. Since the data available for large-sample analysis has 
only limited power to identify personality types, the estimated responses to particular events will 
necessarily be an average across many different personality types, so that the explanatory power 
of equations based on individual responses is likely to be small.   
 
Cultural and societal differences are likely to be important determinants of international 
differences in subjective well-being (Diener 2000). Since suitable variables and degrees of 
freedom are scarce, there may well remain international differences in subjective well-being that 
are not fully explained by available measures of individual and societal differences affecting 
well-being. One of the major aims of this paper will be to include both individual-level and 
societal variables as determinants of well-being so as to be able to estimate their separate 
influences on well-being.       
 
Moving outside the psychology literature, there have been studies using measures of well-
being in the analysis of economic and social policies. For example, Di Tella et al (2000) have 
used survey measures of subjective well-being to evaluate the short-term welfare trade-off  
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between inflation and unemployment. They find, echoing earlier work by Clark and Oswald 
(1994) and Oswald (1997), that individuals rate the subjective cost of unemployment far higher 
than the corresponding loss of money income. They also find an apparently high subjective cost 
of inflation. Although inflation and unemployment are both found to be costly, relative to the 
well-being effects of higher incomes, the trade-off estimated from the well-being data attaches a 
much higher relative weight to unemployment than was implicit in the oft-used misery index
4.  
 
                                                           
4 In the absence of grounds for any easy alternative, the ‘misery index’ has been defined 
as the sum of the percentage unemployment rate and the current annual rate of inflation. 
Broadening the scope of analysis, Frey and Stutzer (2000, 2002) explain differences in 
subjective well-being among Swiss cantons using individual variables plus measures of the direct 
accountability of cantonal administrations, finding that those cantons with more accountable 
government also show higher average measures of subjective well-being. 
 
Putnam (2000, 2001) explains individual measures of well-being with individual-level 
and state-level variables to provide preliminary estimates of the relative contributions of income, 
health, social connectedness and family status to individual well-being. Some of the related 
literature is surveyed in Helliwell (2001a).  
 
4. Data and Key Variables 
This paper analyzes measures of subjective well-being drawn from three successive 
waves of the World Values Survey (WVS, Inglehart et al 2000). The first wave was in 1980-82, 
the second in 1990-91, and the third in the late 1995-97.  Although each wave covers a different 
set of countries, there is sufficient overlap to enable some first assessments of the sources and 
sizes of international differences and changes in subjective well-being. There are too many 
changing factors to permit definitive answers, but the sample size is large enough (totalling  
87,806 observations spread over three waves and forty-six different countries) to permit many of  
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the relevant factors to be taken into account in a consistent manner.  
 
The first wave of the WVS survey provides data for the current research from 18 
industrial countries, all of which were members of the OECD. The  1990-91 second wave 
provides data from 38 countries and the 1995-97 third wave provides data for 30 countries, 
excluding many of the previously surveyed OECD countries. The second and third waves, 
especially the third, contain up to 15 countries or regions from Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union. The changing country coverage means that there is a potential shortage of degrees 
of freedom for the estimation of national-level linkages simultaneously with the application of 
two-way fixed effects. Thus there are 49 different countries or sub-national regions represented 
in one of the three waves, but only 86 total country-wave observations, compared to the 147 there 
would have been if each country were represented in each of the three waves.   
 
To reduce the number of country fixed-effect variables, in order to leave more degrees of 
freedom for the estimation of national-level effects, the countries are divided into six groups. The 
base group, for which no separate variable is required, includes 14 industrial countries (Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Switzerland, UK, and US, with a special sample for Northern Ireland). The other groups include 
countries of the Former Soviet Union (FSU, including Russia, Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Belarus, and special samples from Moscow and the Tambov administrative region), 
other countries of Eastern Europe (EEUR, including Poland, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Hungary, 
Bulgaria, East Germany and Romania), and smaller groups of countries from Latin America 
(LATAM, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela), Asia 
(including China, India, Japan and Taiwan), other developing countries (OTHDEV, including 
Nigeria, South Africa and Turkey), and Scandinavia (SCAN, including Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway and Sweden). Tests have confirmed that these sub-aggregates combine groups 
with fairly similar values for well-being, both before and after adjustment for differing values of 
the independent variables tested. As will be seen, the country groups differ considerably in their 
average levels of well-being, especially before allowance is made for international differences in  
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individual and societal-level factors influencing well-being. 
 
Table 1 (at the end of the paper) shows the means and ranges of the variables used in the 
main results reported in this paper. The specifics of each variable, and references to earlier 
research, are provided when that variable is first introduced to the analysis
5. The transformations 
of WVS variables used to select the observations and define the variables are recorded in SPSS 
syntax files available on request. 
 
5. Results   
 
We start, in equation 1, with an explanation of subjective well-being based on each 
individual’s own characteristics, leaving until equation 2 the introduction of variables relating to 
the society in which the individual lives. In both cases the equations are estimated by least 
squares, allowing for a slightly modified form of two-way fixed effects, including variables for 
each survey wave and for each of the country groups. Alternative functional forms and estimation 
procedures are considered later in the paper. The dependent variable in all equations is the 
individual’s general satisfaction with life on a ten-point scale, with 10.0 representing the greatest 
satisfaction, and 1.0 the greatest dissatisfaction
6.  
 
The first independent variable considered in equation 1 is the individual’s self-assessed 
state of health measured on a five-point scale, with 1 representing very good health and 5 very 
poor health. This variable is always the most significant of all of the explanatory variables. A 
one-point improvement in health, on the five point scale, is associated with a 0.61 point increase 
                                                           
5 The transformations of WVS variables used to select the observations and define the 
variables are recorded in SPSS syntax files available on request. 
6 The distribution of the variable departs from normality by being left-skewed and in 
displaying some tendency to bunch at the middle and end points. The percentage frequencies of 
the ten responses, counting from 1 to 10 on the satisfaction scale, are 3.2, 2.2, 4.8, 5.4, 13.0, 10.4, 
14.6, 20.7, 11.9, and 13.3.  
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in subjective well-being7. Given the means and scales of the variables, a 1% increase in average 
reported health status is associated with just over 1% increase in subjective well-being. From the 
wording of the life satisfaction and health questions, this presumably reflects primarily a long-
term effect, which earlier research (e.g. Brickman et al 1978) has shown to be much smaller than 
the short-term effect, since expectations and comparison groups adjust so as to cushion the well-
being effects of changes in health status. Some earlier research has suggested some non-
linearities in the relation between self-assessed health status and subjective well-being, in 
particular that a drop from ‘poor’ to ‘very poor’ health would have a larger well-being cost than 
other one-point downward movements in health status. To test for this, the equation was re-
estimated using the central value (3= ‘fair health’) as the base case, with separate variables for 
‘very good’, ‘good’, ‘poor’ and ‘very poor’. The results did show higher well-being equivalents 
for below-average health than for above average health. Although all of the one-point differences 
had coefficients that were significantly different from each other, they all lie within the range 
0.46 to 0.86. In this sample of data the largest differences relate to differences between the base 
case and either poor health (-.856) or good health (+.622). To be in very good rather than good 
health adds a further 0.520 to subjective well-being, while being in very poor rather than poor 
health is matched by an average additional drop of 0.462). The well-being equivalent of being in 
very good health rather than very poor health is thus 2.46 points on the 10-point well-being 
scale
8. Since the other coefficients in the equation are not affected by splitting the health variable, 
the further analysis will make use of the simpler form adopted in equation 1. 
 
There is reason to expect that the health coefficient in equation 1 may overstate the size 
                                                           
7 Holding all other individual and societal variables constant in equation 2, a 
disaggregation in the health variable between OECD and the rest produces almost identical 
results: -0.608 for OECD and –0.609 for the rest.  
8 This is smaller than five times the 0.61 estimated in equation 1 because the sample 
responses are unequally divided, with more responses in the groups with larger differences from 
adjacent groups. In particular, the distribution of responses among the five groups ranging from 
very good to very poor are 22.7%, 37.2%, 31.3%, 7.3% and 1.6%. This may to some extent 
reflect a lower sampling probability for those who would self-describe themselves as being in 
very bad health.   
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of the long-term effect of objective health status on subjective well-being, since both are affected 
in the same direction by personality differences. Individuals whose personalities are inherently 
more optimistic are more likely to give positive assessments of their health status and their 
subjective well-being (Okun and George 1984). Comparisons of identical twins raised together 
and apart (Tellegen et al 1988, Lykken and Tellegen 1996) suggest that a large fraction of long-
term interpersonal differences in personality is genetic in nature. Although this fact may bias 
upwards estimates of the long-term linkages between health and well-being, optimism creates 
real linkages as well, since there is ample research showing that those who are optimistic about 
their health prospects, even unrealistically so, have better health outcomes than do those facing 
the same prognosis with a less optimistic frame of mind (e.g. Schier et al 1989). 
 
The second independent variable relates to the individual’s employed status, with 
unemployment  represented by 1.0, with a zero value for those who are either employed or out of 
the labour force. Being unemployed lowers subjective well-being by as much as a one-unit drop 
on the five-point health scale,  averaging -0.61 on the ten-point satisfaction scale. Comparisons 
with income and other effects will be made later, but even before that, it can be reported that 
these results confirm the earlier findings by Clark and Oswald (1994) and Di Tella et al (2000) 
that individuals report large well-being reductions from being unemployed. It is not possible to 
tell from these data how long the surveyed individuals have been, or expect to be, unemployed, 
so no attempts can be made to disentangle habituation effects, which would tend to lessen the 
well-being effect of long-standing unemployment, from the offsetting build-up of debt and 
despair, and the associated obsolescence of job-related human capital. The likely importance of 
habituation effects may be part of the reason why the estimated effect of unemployment on life 
satisfaction is significantly greater for respondents in OECD countries9. 
                                                           
9 The coefficients in equation 2 (individual and societal variables together) are – 0.669 for 
OECD and –0.523 for the rest, holding all other variables constant. This is consistent with Clark 
(2001), which shows that the well-being effects of unemployment are smaller in those regions of 
the United Kingdom where average unemployment rates are higher.  
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The next series of variables relate to family status. We lack information about any aspect 
of respondents’ prior family history, including how long they have been married, separated or 
divorced, or whether there have been previous marriages. Thus we have nothing to contribute to 
the debate about whether findings of weaker correlations between well-being and marriage in 
some previous studies may be due to rising proportions of the now-married who are veterans of 
previous marriages and divorces. It is possible, however, to test whether, as some studies have 
indicated (Argyle 1987), marriage contributes more to the subjective well-being of men than of 
women. Separating the marriage effect by gender showed no difference between men and 
women, so that the equation reported makes no such split. The relevant literature on both debates 
is surveyed by Diener et al. (1999, 290). The results in equation 1 show a hierarchy of well-
being, with those who are married being happiest, followed by the ‘living as married’, widows or 
widowers, the divorced, and the separated. The difference between being married and separated 
amounts to almost three-quarters of a point on the ten point scale, or more than being 
unemployed. The fact that being separated is worse than being divorced may reflect habituation 
and recovery effects that presumably have had more time to work for those who are currently 
divorced than for those who are separated. Most divorces follow separations so that the average 
divorced person has been either separated or divorced for longer than the average separated 
person has been separated. 
 
The results for the education variables may be surprising, since education has been found 
to be the strongest systematic determinant of individual participation in a variety of social 
activities, and social connections have been linked to increased health and well-being (Putnam 
2000). In equation 1 the partial effects of differing levels of education on subjective well-being 
are found to be small and insignificant. One explanation for this finding is that in equation 1 any 
beneficial effects of education flowing though higher incomes, better health, and higher 
perceived trust levels are already taken into account. Also it should be noted that the education 
variables are among the weakest in the WVS data, being based solely on the ages at which 
individuals finish their full-time education. This is a very imperfect guide to how much education  
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has been received or what results or qualifications have been obtained. Education ages and 
quality also differ much from country to country, and much of the variance in the WVS sample is 
across countries. However, it is reasonable to conclude, in a provisional way, that in this 
international context those who have stayed in full-time education until a later age are not 
systematically more satisfied with their lives, once account has been taken of the higher incomes, 
wider participation and better health that might have been facilitated by their education. To 
confirm that education does have important indirect effects on well-being requires additional 
experiments, which have been undertaken and will be reported in the subsequent section. 
 
What about age? Wilson (1967) surveyed the earlier literature, and characterized the 
happy person as being young. Subsequent studies have been able to separate the age linkages 
more systematically from those of income, health and other variables. More recent reviews 
(Myers and Diener 1995, Diener et al 1999) have dismissed Wilson’s conclusion, and found no 
systematic age pattern. Perhaps because the WVS sample is so large, and health and income are 
separately accounted for, the WVS current results show a strong U-shaped pattern of the sort 
previously found by Blanchflower and Oswald (2000) for Britain and the United States, and 
replicated in other recent studies. The base group comprises those aged 18-24. Those in the next 
three age groups are significantly less happy than those aged 18-24, providing some partial 
support for the earlier view that life is happier for the young. However after reaching a low point 
among the 35-44 year-old group, subjective well-being thereafter rises systematically and 
significantly, with those 55 to 64 as happy as those aged 18 to 24, and those aged 65 and up 
much happier still. The size of the changes is large, with those over 65 having well-being more 
than one-half point higher (on the ten-point scale) than those 35 to 44, a difference almost as 
great as that between the employed and unemployed.10 
 
Earlier research has found a strong correlation between measures of religious activity and 
                                                           
10 The age coefficients for OECD are: 25-34: -0.224, 35-44: -0.383, -0.368, 45-54: -
0.368, 55-64: -0.126, 65+: 0.267. The corresponding coefficients for the rest of the sample are:  
25-34: -0.168, 35-44: -0.324, 45-54: -0.305, 55-64: - 0.0774, 65+: 0.06341. The general pattern 
is the same in the two groups of countries, but old age is more satisfying in the OECD countries.  
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subjective well-being. There has been some debate as to whether this is due to the support 
provided by religious beliefs and convictions or to the social and community networks provided 
by regular participation in church activities. The WVS data permit these two channels to be 
separately evaluated, since respondents are asked about the importance of God to their lives as 
well as how frequently they attend church. The results show that both variables have strong and 
easily distinguished linkages to life satisfaction. Those who report that God is very important to 
their lives (33% of the sample) have life satisfaction measures higher by 0.34, with the effect of 
weekly or more frequent church attendance (22% of the sample) also being significant, although 
only one-third as large
11. Tests of differences of these effects among religious faiths show that 
they apply across all major faiths. 
 
                                                           
11 The simple correlation between the two variables is 0.40. Of the roughly 29,000 for 
whom God is very important, fewer than half go to church one or more times per week. Of the 
20,000 who go to church at least once per week, two-thirds report that God is very important to 
their lives.  
As a prelude to consideration of variables relating to measures of the quality of national 
institutions, equation 1 considers individual assessments of some key elements of each nation’s 
social capital.  There are two variables relating to each individual’s own participation in 
voluntary organizations of all types except church groups, since church affiliation and 
participation is covered by a separate variable. One variable (MEM12) covers the first two waves 
of the survey, while the other relates to the third wave (MEM3). Two variables are used because 
the voluntary associations question was asked differently in the third wave, producing 
significantly higher average participation rates (Inglehart et al. 2000). The different average 
participation rate in the third wave will also be responsible for part of the coefficient on the fixed 
effect for the third wave. The coefficients on both membership variables show that individuals 
who are involved in more voluntary associations report higher average satisfaction with their 
lives. The variable measures the total number of membership types for each respondent. The  
 14 
coefficient on the variable for the first two waves suggests that someone with an additional 
voluntary group membership, with an average degree of involvement, has well-being that is 
higher by 0.05, about a tenth as much as marriage. The number is estimated to be twice as large 
in the third wave. Since optimistic individuals are more likely to report themselves satisfied with 
life, and to assume the best from new ventures, they are probably also more likely to join and 
participate in voluntary associations. Thus the positive partial correlation between individual 
memberships and well-being may reflect in part the common influence of personality differences, 
just as was argued above for physical health. However, it will be shown later that societies with 
high averages of social capital, as measured by membership densities, also show higher levels of 
subjective well-being, other things held constant. This relation cannot be readily attributed to 
personality differences amongst individuals, since these average out at the national level.  
 
 The ‘NOCHEAT” variable takes the value of 1.0 for every individual who thinks that it 
is never justifiable to cheat on taxes. As shown in Table 1, slightly more than half of the 
respondents think that cheating on taxes is never justifiable, and equation 1 shows that they 
systematically report themselves more satisfied with their lives. The same is true for those who 
reply ‘yes’ when asked if they think that, in general, people can be trusted, rather than the 
alternative that you cannot be too careful when dealing with people. It is tempting to treat this 
positive effect of trust assessments as representing the well-recognized individual benefits of 
living in a high-trust society. However, it cannot be only that, as equation 2 will show shortly that 
the coefficient on individual differences in trust assessments remains unchanged even after 
national differences in trustworthiness are taken into account separately.  
 
Perhaps this is one more instance where optimism produces higher assessments of both 
trust and well-being. An alternative view is that individuals differ in their sub-national 
communities, and their answers relate to the run of people with whom they interact, and not to 
the nation as a whole. This alternative view would permit the interpretation of the positive effect 
as representing the benefits of living in a high-trust community, assuming that most of the 
interpersonal differences in trust assessments represented differences among communities in the  
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same nation in the average level of trustworthy behaviour.  
 
Earlier studies and surveys of the literature on the effects of income on subjective well-
being provide an ambiguous picture. For samples of data including individuals within the same 
country, those with higher relative incomes generally
12 show significantly higher measures of 
subjective well-being, although the magnitude of the effect is often described as small (Diener et 
al 1999, 287). It has also been noted that big increases in individual income or wealth, such as 
those provided by a large lottery win, show well-being effects that are positive but declining with 
time to fairly small residual levels (Smith and Razell 1975, Brickman et al 1978). Simple cross-
country correlations of GDP per capita and measures of subjective well-being show a significant 
positive correlation (Myers and Diener 1995, 13), but countries with faster-growing GDP per 
capita have not shown corresponding increases in well-being (Easterlin 1974, 1995, Myers and 
Diener 1995, 13, Oswald 1997). In some countries there is evidence of increasing prevalence of 
materialistic goals among the young (Astin, Korn and Riggs 1993), which might be thought to 
lead to larger or more significant higher well-being effects from higher incomes. However, other 
studies found that individuals attaching high subjective values to financial success have lower 
values for subjective well-being, even when their financial aspirations were met. (Kasser and 
Ryan 1993, 1996).  
 
                                                           
12 But Clark and Oswald (1994) do not find a significant effect in their sample of UK 
data. 
The WVS data offer some advantages and some disadvantages in identifying the linkages 
between income and well-being. The advantages flow from the very large sample size, and the 
inclusion of countries and individuals with very different levels of income. The disadvantages 
relate to the difficulties of comparing relative incomes among countries and among individuals. 
To compare incomes across countries, we use real GDP per capita, measured at purchasing 
power parities, in the year of the survey, making use of the Penn World Tables, as updated in the  
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World Bank growth dataset. To capture individual incomes, the WVS asks respondents to place 
their family incomes on a ten-point scale, where the ranges they are offered are supposed to be 
based on the family income deciles in that country and year. 
 
 Theory and some previous research suggest that the effects of individual and national 
incomes may be non-linear in nature, with smaller well-being effects attached to increases in 
income beyond levels sets by each individual’s or society’s expectations and habits (Offer 2000). 
Habituation effects are hard to establish with the WVS data, since there is no way to tell how the 
family incomes reported relate to recent or normal levels. To search for non-linearity of the 
individual relative income variable, the equation includes the decile value (where the range is 
from .1 to 1, and the mean is 0.5) and the decile value squared. In equation 1, both take 
significant coefficients, with signs that imply diminishing returns to higher relative incomes. For 
an individual to move from the fourth to the fifth decile in the distribution of family incomes 
raises well-being by +0.10 (=1.91*.1-.96*.09), while to move from the ninth to the tenth decile is 
associated with an increase in well-being of only 0.01 (=1.91*.1-.96*.19). This is despite the fact 
that for most countries the move from the ninth to the tenth decile involves a much larger 
absolute and relative increase in income than to move from the fourth to the fifth decile. Thus 
there are sharply decreasing well-being effects from higher incomes relative to those elsewhere in 
the same country
13  
                                                           
13 The situation is more complicated if one uses separate variables for each income decile, 
with the lowest decile as a base case. The changes to subjective well-being from each of the nine 
steps from the second to the tenth decile (with the basis for comparison being respondents in the 
lowest decile) are +.091, +.190, +.138, +.113, +.024, +.125, +.015, -.012, and +.090. The general 
pattern of declining increments is apparent, but there is some evidence of additional sense of 
well-being from being in the top decile, which represents in many countries a substantial increase 
in income from the deciles immediately below. Subsequent work has established a clear 
distinction between the effects of relative income in the OECD and in the developing countries. 
For the poorer countries, there continue to be significant increases in subjective well-being from 
increases in relative income throughout the ten deciles, while for OECD countries, the increases 
in well-being with income are concentrated in the first four deciles, with no significant increases 
in subjective well-being beyond that point (holding constant all other variables, of course). When 
the effects are estimated separately for OECD and non-OECD countries, they are: OECD: -
0.0325 (not significant), +0.00179 (not significant), +0.124,+0.208, +0.195, +0.243, +0.232,  
 17 
 
To extend the analysis internationally, and to try to disentangle the statistical effects of 
absolute income levels from those of domestic and international relative incomes, it is necessary 
to make the first addition of national variables, as reported in equation 2. Adding several national 
variables alters the size and significance of the individual variables surprisingly little, even 
where, as in the case of trust, the national value being used is the national average of the 
corresponding individual variable.  
 
The addition of variables describing the structure of the national society raises the 
explained variance from 25.5% to 26.3% if the regional and time variables are in the equations, 
or from 15% to 25.6% if they are not. Comparing the regional variables and the national societal 
variables as means of explaining the variation in well-being not explained by individual factors, 
the national variables are collectively slightly more powerful (25.6% of variance explained by the 
national variables compared to 25.5% for the time and regional variables, with individual-level 
variables included in both cases). The national societal variables and the regional variables are 
partly substitutes and partly complements, in that both remain highly significant in equation 2 
which contains both. Our main interpretation will centre on equation 2 rather than on equation 1, 
which excludes regional effects. This is a not matter of much consequence, as comparison of the 
two equations show that the inclusion of regional effects does not generally change the 
coefficients on the societal variables. The main exceptions are those for education, due to low 
well-being and high education levels in the FSU and Eastern European countries. Thus although 
it is clear that there is ample scope to find new explanations for the remaining regional  effects, 
the current societal variables are not achieving their success merely as back-door ways of 
capturing regional differences based on other factors. However, subsequent robustness checks 
suggest that attempts to increase the number of country dummy variables, or to change the 
numbers and natures of the country groupings, do have material effects on some of the contextual 
variables. This is because of the relatively small number of observations of the national 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
+0.223, +0.333. REST: +0.158, +0.445, +0.584, +0.716, +0.771, +0.976, +1.071, +1.142, 
+1.254.  
 18 
variables- often as little as one per country – so that the power of the equation to identify the 
effects of national variables is seriously affected by inclusion of larger numbers of country 
variables. This suggests caution in interpretation of the sizes on some of the national variables, 
and puts a premium on extending the data sample to include the millennial round of the World 
Values Survey. In addition, the standard errors reported in equation 2 assume independence of 
individual error terms within national samples. Allowing for with-country error correlations, as is 
done later in the paper, raises the standard errors on the societal-level effects, and leads to a 
corresponding reduction in the number of national level effects that can be separated to a high 
degree of statistical significance.  
 
Now that equation 2 has been introduced, we can return to the consideration of individual 
and national income effects. The national income per capita variable is scaled by showing each 
country’s average relative to the value for 1997 in the United States. The logarithm and the 
square of this variable are then included, and both attract highly significant coefficients. This pair 
of variables is strongly preferred by the data to simply the level and the square, or to any of the 
three variables on their own.  We find that national average income also has diminishing returns, 
since the logarithm of average per capita income takes a positive coefficient, while the square 
takes a negative coefficient. Use of dummy variables for each decile of the international 
distribution of national average per capita incomes shows evidence of a double hump, with local 
peaks about one-third and two-thirds of the way up the national income ladder. However, the use 
of decile data reduces excessively the number of degrees of freedom available to identify 
significant national income and other national-level effects. Grouping of deciles will be used 
later in the paper to address this issue. It is much easier to use individual deciles to establish 
relative income effects within each country, because the sample sizes are large enough to identify 
fairly stable and very significant patterns, and to establish different patterns for the OECD and 
developing countries. A fresh round of data from the larger end-of-century WVS survey should 




The next societal variable to be added is the average level of interpersonal trust. This is as 
estimated by the national average answer to the question: “In general, do you think that people 
can be trusted, or alternatively, that you can’t be too careful when dealing with people?
14”  Knack 
(2001) has shown that international differences in sample average responses to this question are 
good predictors of international differences in the proportion of experimentally dropped money-
filled wallets that are returned with their contents intact. Hence average individual assessments of 
the extent to which people in general can be trusted mirror at least some key aspects of the 
trustworthiness of their fellow citizens. It would be useful to have more specific information 
about the radius of trust people assume when answering the question. The Knack (2001) finding 
suggests that people are responding to their experience in and knowledge of their own national 
societies, although there may well be admixtures of more local and more international experience 
being taken into account. 
 
                                                           
14 This way of asking the trust question was used by Almond and Verba (1963) in their 
pioneering study of democracy, and has been the main basis for comparative research for more 
than forty years. 
Equation 2 shows that differences in national average trust over time and across countries 
have a large and significant effect on subjective well-being. This does not flow from a false 
relation linking optimism with assessments of general trustworthiness and of personal well-
being, since the equation also includes the individual’s own estimate to which others can be 
trusted. Hence the coefficient on the national trust variable has some claim to reflect the average 
perceived benefits to individuals of living in an environment where other people can be trusted. 
The coefficient of 0.32 implies that average well-being would increase by .03 on a ten-point scale 
for each 0.1 increase in the proportion of the population judging that people can in general be 
trusted. A difference of 0.1 in average trust levels is less than the sample standard deviation of 
0.14, and less than one-third of the difference between trust levels in France and Norway, a 
comparison used by Grjebine (2000) and Helliwell (2001a) in the analysis of international  
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differences in traffic behaviour and road fatalities. 
 
The next societal variable is based on a large World Bank effort to collect and analyze 
measures of the quality of governance for more than 150 countries in the 1990s. The authors 
(Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatoni 1999a, 1999b) summarize and interpolate data collected 
by others for an average of more than 25 different indicators of the quality of governance, 
divided into six separate aspects: voice and accountability, stability and lack of violence, 
government effectiveness, the regulatory framework, the rule of law, and the control of 
corruption. For each group of indicators, the measures are scaled to have a mean of zero across 
all of the countries included, and a range from +2.5 to -2.5. An aggregate formed by summing the 
five measures to a single index of the quality of governance (GOVTOT) has a mean of 0.65 for 
the countries represented in the WVS data, and ranges from 1.72 for Switzerland at the top to -
1.00 for Nigeria at the bottom. There are many reasons why higher values for such a variable 
would be associated with higher average levels of subjective well-being. Many services crucial to 
individuals and families, ranging from education and health to justice and transportation, are 
regulated and provided by governments. The quality of the services received, for any given 
amount of resources expended, is likely to be higher where the overall quality of government is 
higher. Perhaps more important, the confidence with which individuals face their future is likely 
to depend considerably on the confidence with which they can rely on  government services 
being available when and where they are needed. 
 
The coefficient of .32 (t=12.0) on the GOVTOT variable implies substantial well-being 
benefits from improvements in the quality of governance. For example, an improvement in the 
quality of government in Belarus (-.76) to that of Hungary (+.87) would (if the relation were 
causal) increase the average well-being of a citizen of Belarus by more than marriage, by about as 
much as the combined effect of religious belief and church attendance, and almost as much as 
moving from the bottom to the top decile in the country’s income distribution.   
 
Two societal variables were considered for physical health- the infant mortality rate and  
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the average life expectancy. Life expectancy had no significant effect. An earlier version of this 
paper identified a significant effect of the infant mortality rate, which was eventually found to 
have the wrong sign, and in any event be due for its significance to entirely to one country 
(Japan) which had the lowest infant mortality rate (4.3 per 10,000, compared to 7.1 per 10,000 in 
the United States, and a high of 81.1 in Nigeria), and also with subjective well-being lower than 
its circumstances would otherwise have suggested. More research is required to gather better 
societal level measures of averages levels and distribution of states of physical health. When the 
next round of WVS data becomes available, there will be more degrees of freedom to identify 
different patterns of national and possible even sub-national level contextual effects.  
 
6. Social Capital, Education and Well-Being 
It has already been shown that the national values of the trust variable have systematic 
positive effects on well-being, reflecting some of the benefits flowing to individuals living in 
societies where trust replaces suspicion and fear. These direct benefits on well-being are in 
addition to those that may flow through greater efficiency in economic affairs and government, 
since these channels are already directly modelled. Higher values of trust are often thought of as 
one of the main channels through which increases in the right types of social capital improve 
economic and social well-being. Sometimes measures of trust are included as part of what is 
meant by social capital, although there is some evidence of emerging consensus to treat trust as 
an immediate consequence of the right types of social capital, where the latter is more narrowly 
defined, for example to include “networks together with shared norms, values and 
understandings which facilitate co-operation within or among groups” (OECD 2001). We are 
now in a position to see if increases in the national density or quality of these norms and 
networks increase individual well-being beyond the widely-recognized benefits of individual 
participation, and in addition to the effects flowing through higher national average values of 
trust.  
 
A first fairly obvious norm to consider is whether the members of a society readily agree 
to pay their allotted shares of the costs of their collective actions. A natural measure for this is the  
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national average fraction of respondents who think that it is never appropriate to cheat on their 
taxes. We have already seen that individuals who think that cheating on taxes is wrong have 
higher subjective well-being. Now we are in a position to see if their well-being is systematically 
higher if they live in a society in which people generally think that it is wrong to cheat on taxes. 
The coefficient on the national average measure (NOCHEATN) is 0.26 (t=4.3), implying 
significant further benefits to shared high standards for communal responsibility. Adding the 
national variable only slightly reduces the coefficient on the individual’s own opinion of tax 
cheating. The sum of the two coefficients is almost 0.5, suggesting that the benefits of a widely 
supported set of tax rules go beyond direct savings in collection and enforcement costs. People 
who cheat appear to be less happy. Widespread acceptance of cheating lowers average 
satisfaction, whatever one’s own willingness to condone cheating. 
 
We have already seen that those who are more connected, whether through participation 
in churches or other voluntary organizations, are more satisfied with their lives. What remains 
now to be seen is whether their participation makes others better off as well. To assess this 
possibility, equation 2 includes national average levels of the weekly-or-more church attendance 
variable, and national average memberships in other voluntary associations. As already noted, the 
other memberships question took a different form in the third wave of the WVS, and elicited 
higher average responses, so that separate variables are used for the third wave. The results 
suggest that on average the benefits of high church attendance flow mainly to the church goers 
themselves, since the variable takes a smaller coefficient than is attracted by the variable for 
other memberships. Both variables for other memberships take significant positive coefficients. 
The evidence from all types of memberships suggests that there are positive spillovers to the 
well-being of others. Previous research did not find any such spillovers from memberships to 
economic growth (e.g. Knack and Keefer 1997, Helliwell 1996a, Knack 2001), and in any event 
income levels are already accounted for in equation 2, so the national membership effects in 
equation 2 would seem to flow directly to well-being rather than through income or trust. The 
estimated effects are large and significant. If everyone joined one additional group, the resulting 
increase in well-being would exceed that from marriage. Using the third wave coefficients, for  
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example, the average well-being would increase by .06 from the individual effect and .58 from 
the national effect, for a total effect of 0.64. Of course, such an increase would be historically 
unprecedented, and represents a larger difference than that between the most and least 
horizontally connected of the national societies included in the data. The most important feature 
of these results is that the spillover effects on the well-being of others are estimated to be 
substantially larger than the direct benefits, even after taking into account any benefits that may 
have flowed through higher trust or higher incomes. 
 
Turning to education, equation 2 includes a measure of the average educational 
attainment in each society, measured in completed years. The data are based on the de la Fuente 
and Donénech (2000) estimates for the OECD countries and the Barro and Lee (1996) estimates 
for other countries. The two sources should be consistent, since the OECD data are intended to 
improve on the Barro and Lee data for the OECD countries while keeping the same basic 
methodology. Their data for 1980 are used for the first wave of the WVS, and their 1990 
estimates are used for both waves in the 1990s, in the absence of more recent data
15. The national 
attainment data show no net impact on well-being. 
 
How can these neutral results for the partial effects of own and national education be 
squared with earlier research (e.g. Wilson 1967) suggesting that the typical happy person is well-
educated? To see if there is a conflict, equation 3 replicates the sort of direct estimate that was 
frequently employed in early studies. The equation simply adds the individual and national 
education attainment variables to the most basic equation including only time and regional fixed 
effects. The results are quite striking. One’s own education has a strong positive effect on well-
being, and the strong positive effect from the national average variable indicates the existence of 
positive spillovers to others. Equation 4 adds the full set of individual determinants of well-
                                                           
15 Alternative measures based on secondary and tertiary enrolment rates, and their 
average, were also assessed, and proved empirically weaker. The attainment data are in any case 
theoretically preferable, since average well-being should depend on average attainment, and not 
on the current pace of educational investment.  
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being. The individual education effects are largely removed, while the national spillovers remain 
strongly significant. Only when the other national variables are included, as in equation 2, do the 
spillover effects of education disappear. The inference to be drawn is presumably that the 
individual well-being benefits of education flow primarily through their well-documented effects 
on participation, health, perceived trust, and higher incomes
16. In a parallel way, the beneficial 
spillovers apparent from equations 3 and 4 are fully captured by the channels captured by the 
national norms and networks variables
17. Thus these results suggest once more the importance of 
separating direct and indirect influences, and making conclusions conditional on particular sets of 
other variables and channels of influence. The well-documented benefits of education appear to 
flow less through a direct impact on life satisfaction than through its positive effects on the 
creation and maintenance of human and social capital
18. 
 
Other variables assessed but not used in equation 2 include a measure of nationwide 
income inequality and a simple variable designed to capture generational effects
19. There is some 
cross-section evidence that increased income inequality is associated with lower rates of 
economic growth (Persson and Tabellini 1994), and worse health outcomes
20. Equation 2 would 
                                                           
16 Tests show that the individual variables for income, health, memberships, trust and tax 
cheating all played a role in reducing the positive effect of one’s own education. On the effects of 
education, social capital and other aspects of socioeconomic status on health, see Wolfe and 
Haveman (2001) and Michalos et al (2000). 
17 Tests show that the national variables for trust and quality of government were the 
biggest contributors to reducing the coefficient on national educational attainment. 
18 See OECD (2001) for a survey of the evidence. 
19 The generational variable was a variable that took the value 1.0 for each respondent 
born prior to 1950. Putnam (1995, 2000) has found that in the United States those who were born 
prior to 1950 show significantly higher community involvement and trust. Such effects may be 
captured in equation 2 by the inclusion of the membership and trust variables. However, the 
generational variable did not contribute directly to the international well-being equation whether 
or not the trust and membership variables were included. 
20 On the effects of income inequality and social capital on health outcomes, see 
Wilkinson (1992), Kawachi et al (1997), Ben-Shlomo et al (1996), Gravelle (1998), Wolfson et  
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capture these effects through the health status and income variables. Adding a World Bank 
estimate of the Gini coefficient for each national economy added no explanatory power to the 
well-being equation. There are, however, some well-being effects of income inequality implied 
by the non-linear way in which personal and national average incomes enter the well-being 
equation. Because the quadratic terms are negative both for the decile position of individuals and 
the average national income, an economy with a more equal distribution of income will achieve a 
higher average level of well-being, for any given level of average per capita incomes. The size of 
these effects depends on the functional forms being used, and may well differ by country 
(Alesina 2001). More tests and perhaps better data are required to permit more confident 
conclusions.  
 
Finally, a word about the remaining regional effects, which in equation 2 are still 
substantially negative for the countries of the former Soviet Union, with a negative effect almost 
half as large for the countries of Eastern Europe. Subsequent tests, reported in the next section, 
show that this simple average hides important changes over time. In 1990 the negative residuals 
are equally large in the FSU and Eastern Europe, between 1990 and the mid-1990s survey they 
grow even larger for the FSU and largely disappear in Eastern Europe. The three Baltic countries 
have been included in the FSU variable, although their experience before, during and since their 
time as parts of the Soviet Union is very different from that of other republics. However, tests 
show the coefficient for the Baltics to be similar to that for the rest of the FSU. There are 
significant positive regional effects in Latin America and Scandinavia, and negative effects in 
Asia and the Other Developing category. It is interesting to compare these post-modelling 
residual regional effects with what would be implied by the basic data. If an equation is run 
including only the regional and time fixed effects, the negative regional effects in the FSU and 
Eastern Europe are far larger, at -2.34 (t=99) and -1.20 (t=43), as are those in Asia (-.502, t=18) 
and for other developing countries (-.686, t=22). The Scandinavian positive effect in the simple 
regression is much higher in the simple equation (+.612, t=23), while that for Latin America is -
                                                                                                                                                                                           
al (1999), and Rose (2000).  
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.173 (t=6).  
 
Adjusting for the international differences in personal and especially national variables 
has the effect of sharply reducing the otherwise unexplained regional effects, and of shifting the 
Latin American effect from negative to positive. In all cases the comparisons are with the 
remaining OECD countries. This implies that relative to the main body of OECD countries, the 
key explanatory variables are less favourable in all of the developing regions, and especially in 
the FSU and Eastern Europe, than in the OECD. The reverse is true for the Scandinavian 
countries, which have more beneficial values for most variables than is the case elsewhere in the 
OECD. Even after allowing for these effects, self-assessments of well-being in Scandinavia 
remain higher than elsewhere in the OECD. In Latin America, even though self-assessed well-
being is lower than in OECD countries, the differential is less than our model would predict, so 
that when the full model is applied the surveyed Latin Americans are more satisfied with their 
lives than their circumstances would suggest.     
 
6. Robust Estimation of a Revised Equation    
  In some respects, the results in equation 2 seem too good to be true, showing 
independently significant effects of a wide range of individual and national effects. With respect 
to the national effects, such scepticism is justified. The least squares estimation adopted for 
equation 2 assumes that each observation is drawn from the same distribution, thus providing a 
very large number of degrees of freedom. However, there are no doubt systematic differences 
among countries in the error terms as well as in the key variables used in the equation. Thus it is 
appropriate to adopt an estimation strategy that calculates robust standard errors recognizing the 
correlation of error terms among respondents in the same country (Moulton 1990). This has the 
effect of reducing to about 50 the number of independent observations available for estimating 
the effects of national variables. This does not change the values of the coefficients, but does 
increase, almost threefold, the standards errors on the national variables. This increase in 
standard errors removes some of what previously were significant differences among sub-groups, 
and suggests a slimmer specification of key national variables.    
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Equation 5 shows the results of re-estimating the full model with robust standard errors. 
This equation also embodies several of the insights that were discovered through the various 
specification tests that have already been described in the text and footnotes. The final equation 
also makes further refinements to the estimation strategy, by using an ordered probit in place of 
the linear model employed for equation 2, and allows appropriately for the differing sampling 
weights in each country survey. The probit form is more general than the linear form, since it 
does not have to assume that each move from one level to the next of the life-satisfaction index 
has the same importance to the individual. However, the differences between cut-lines, shown 
below the equation, are of roughly equal size, suggesting that the linear assumption was not 
seriously incorrect. Thus the results do not depend importantly on whether the measures of 
subjective well-being are treated as ordinal or cardinal. The cut-line results also provide a handy 
metric to interpret the size of the coefficients in the probit equation. Dividing each coefficient by 
the average distance between cut-lines provides coefficients comparable to those in the earlier 
equations. Roughly speaking, this involves slightly more than doubling the coefficients in 
equation 5. Thus most of the key individual effects remain the same as in equation 2.  Based on 
earlier tests, the effects of unemployment on well-being are now estimated separately for OECD 
and non-OECD residents. They are highly significant in both groups of countries, but are 
significantly higher in the OECD. The effects are relative income are now shown in much more 
detail, and separately for OECD and other countries. The bottom three deciles in the OECD, and 
the bottom 2 in the rest of the countries are combined, because they are not significantly 
different. As noted earlier in the paper, increases in individual incomes, relative to others in the 
same country, are matched by continuing increases in subjective well-being in the poorer 
countries, but not in the OECD countries, where average incomes are much higher.  
 
Equation 5 includes only those national variables for which the coefficients remain 
significant with the revised estimation techniques, plus three variables covering groups of 
countries with different levels of national income per capita. The significant variables relate to  
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the overall quality of government21 and the average number of memberships. Since the 
difference between the membership effects is not significantly different between survey waves, a 
single effect is estimated, which is slightly larger than was the average effect in equation 2, after 
allowing for the difference in the functional form of the equations. The national income effects 
are now estimated by splitting the countries into four groups, with the base category being 
countries with real per capita GDP less then 20 percent of that in the United States in 1996. 
Separate coefficients are then estimated for the additional well-being for those in countries with 
20 to 50% of US per capita GDP, 50 to 75%, and over 75%. As can be seen, the well-being 
effects of living in higher income countries are small and insignificant, and do not show any 
evidence of subsequent increase once GDP per capita exceeds half that in the United States in the 
mid 1990s. Yet it remains the case that on average, subjective well-being is much higher in 
OECD than in non-OECD countries, and the OECD countries are also much richer. Why this 
apparent paradox? The reasoning is the similar to that in the case of education. A reduced-form 
equation shows that subjective well-being is higher in the richer countries, but both education 
and income effects fall out in the full model, which includes health, social connections, and the 
quality of government, all of which are higher in the richer countries22. Those who have the 
                                                           
21 Consideration was also given a variable that takes the value of 1.0 for each respondent who 
thinks that ‘most or all public officials (in the country) are engaged in bribe-taking and 
corruption.’ This is perhaps the best individual-level assessment of governmental quality 
available from the WVS survey data, and shows systematically higher subjective well-being 
among those who do not view their governments as corrupt. There is a strongly significant 
correlation between this individual-level measure and the aggregate measure of governmental 
quality. Including the individual-level view of corruption does not drive out the aggregate 
variable, which remains highly significant even with the revised estimation methods. However, 
the final version of equation 5 leaves out this variable, since the question was not asked in all 
countries and in all waves, so that its inclusion could bias the residual estimates of country and 
region effects. The coefficient on corrupt was -.08 (t=5.8), with most other coefficients 
unchanged to 3 or 4 significant figures. 
22 To be more specific, when only the three average income variables are included in a linear 
equation with robust standard errors, the well-being effects grow with each income group, being 
+1.01 (t=3.0) for y2050 (relative to countries with y less than 20% of that in the United States), 
1.61 (t=4.8) for y5075, and 1.87 (t=5.5) for yover75. Adding govtot to the equation cuts these 
effects in half, and renders them insignificant. Adding health status makes the income effects 
start to fall after the middle income range is reached. If average education and the income 
variables are used in alternative equations, the education variable is stronger than the income  
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highest levels of subjective well-being are not those who live in the richest countries, but those 
who live where social and political institutions are effect, where mutual trust is high, and 
corruption is low.  
 
Equation 5 also re-estimates the specific regional effects, which reflect international 
differences in subjective well-being that remain significant even after allowing for all of the 
model’s explanatory variables and the new methods of estimating standard errors. Scandinavia 
remains a significant positive outlier. Following the tests reported earlier, the effects for Eastern 
Europe and the Former Soviet Union have been split by time period. In 1990, subjective well-
being was abnormally low in both regions, by even more in Eastern Europe than in the FSU. By 
the mid-1990s, however, things had got even worse in the FSU, even relative to the declining 
circumstances, but there was no significant negative residual in Eastern Europe. This pattern is 
revealed strongly by the coefficients reported in Equation 5. Regional effects for other groups of 
countries are no longer significant with robust standard errors, and are therefore not present in 
equation 5.  
 
7. Conclusions and Prospects    
This paper has attempted to illustrate rather than exhaust the possibilities for using 
international well-being data to measure and explain differences in well-being within and among 
nations. International well-being data permit the combined use of individual and societal 
variables. This in turn makes it possible to identify the consequences of societal or ecological 
variables, whether they be the consequences of history, government policy, or community 
choices. The well-being data themselves have fairly good claims as measures of individual 
welfare. Insofar as these claims are justified, the coefficients can be used to combine what might 
otherwise be incommensurable results into an overall welfare assessment of changes in policies 
or institutions. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
variable if the equation also includes the FSU and Eastern Europe effects. National education 
does not perform so well in a simple equation without the FSU effects, since well-being is  
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The use of well-being studies for the comparison of societies and the evaluation of 
alternative policies is still in its infancy. The firmest recommendation is thus for better data and 
more research. Some researchers of well-being have argued that it is not too soon to think of 
constructing national well-being indexes to supplement and improve the available measures used 
for cross-national comparisons (Diener 2000). In a sense, this is what the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) has already done with its measures of the quality of life, and 
what others have done to develop broader measures of economic well-being (Osberg and Sharpe 
2001). The availability of large samples of well-being data offers the prospect of much stronger 
empirical grounding for attempts to devise measures and comparisons of well-being, and to 
compare alternative policies intended to improve well-being. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
especially low there, and education levels high. 
One of the particular branches of social science that has much to gain from systematic use 
of well-being data is the study of the causes and consequences of social capital. The widespread 
interest among social scientists and policy-makers in social capital has much to do with 
influential studies, especially those of Putnam (1995, 2000) that have shown sharp falls in trust 
and participation over the past forty years in the United States, following a period of rapid rise 
over the first sixty years of the twentieth century. The final decades of the twentieth century have 
also seen rapid economic growth and greater inequality of income distribution in the United 
States. Are these economic and social trends connected? If so, then how, and how can they be 
jointly assessed?  
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The last decade of the past century started with the fall of the Berlin Wall. This led to 
rapidly increased openness in the countries formerly behind the iron curtain. The fall of the Wall 
was thought at the time to presage, with good luck and help from others, fairly rapid convergence 
of economic and social conditions towards those in Western Europe (Marer and Zecchini 1991). 
But in the succeeding decade, as the WVS and other data document starkly, things have gone 
from bad to worse in many of the countries involved, and even in the luckiest and likeliest 
countries the standards of material and overall well-being are now barely matching what they 
were in 199023.  
 
                                                           
23 For example, the 1999 Annual Report of the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development estimated that of the 25 former East Bloc countries monitored by the EBRD, only 
Poland and Slovenia had by 1998 regained their 1989 levels of real GDP, while the levels of real 
GDP in Russia and Ukraine in 1998 were only 55% and 37%, respectively, of what they had been 
in 1989.  
Both of these striking pieces of history invite attempts to assess their causes and 
consequences, and to explain the extent to which they arise from common causes. Analysis of 
well-being data provides means for combining income, employment, governmental effectiveness, 
family structure and social relations together in ways that permit the external effects of 
institutions and public policies to be assessed. To provide a specific example, many earlier 
studies of the importance and quality of national legal systems and governance in general have 
emphasized only the effects that flow through economic growth (e.g. Mauro 1995, Helliwell 
1996a, Knack and Keefer 1997, Knack 2001). The well-being data show that the effects flowing 
directly from the quality of the institutions may dwarf those that flow through productivity and 
economic growth. Putnam (2001) provides an insightful example of how well-being data can be 
used to compare the effects of income, education and social capital, using both individual-level 
and state-level variables to help identify spillover effects at the state level. His example provided 




There are many ways in which the preliminary research reported here invites further tests 
and extensions. One feature missing entirely from this paper is consideration of the extent to 
which geography matters. The paper has made use of regional variables, for example, on the 
assumption (supported by the data) that well-being moves in similar ways in at least some groups 
of neighbouring countries. The paper has made even more use of national variables, assuming, 
with some justification but not much testing, that national borders do indeed define the edges 
where societal cleavages are most abrupt. The WVS data do contain sub-national regions, so that 
it should be possible to test more extensively whether intra-national well-being linkages are 




                                                           
24 McCallum (1995) discovered that trade linkages were twenty times tighter among 
Canadian provinces than between Canadian provinces and US states. Helliwell (1998, 2000) 
reports a broader range of evidence, covering many more countries, also suggesting that national 
borders still mark much more important boundaries in economic and social space than is 
generally believed. Keller (2000) shows that geography and borders both matter for technological 
spillovers. Helliwell (1996b) makes a preliminary attempt to combine sub-national and 
international data for social capital. 
Finally, it is important to re-emphasize that in many cases the methodology used in this 
and earlier studies can establish linkages or correlations but not prove the existence or direction 
of causation. It is especially important to remember this caution when considering policy 
initiatives that might help or hinder some type of activity that research has linked to measures of 
well-being. Unless the causal chain does indeed run from the activity to well-being, the policy 
change may not have the intended effects. Even if the chain does run in the intended direction, a 
change in activity level that arises from the policy change may have different consequences from  
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previous changes that arose for other reasons. Thus well-being research does not yet provide a 
complete guide to choices for private behaviour and public policies. It does enrich substantially 
the scope for considering the well-being consequences of a broad range of disparate trends, and 
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Table 1: Data Summary 
 
Min Max Mean  Std.  Deviation 
life satisfaction    1  10  6.79  2.37 
state of health    1  5  2.28  0.95 
UNEMP    0  1  0.0541  0.2263 
MARRIED    0 1 0.6217  0.485 
ASMARR   0 1 0.05059  0.2192 
DIVORCED    0 1 0.03876  0.193 
SEPAR    0  1  0.0168  0.1285 
WIDOWED    0 1 0.0641  0.2449 
ED1619    0  1  0.3605  0.4802 
ED2022    0  1  0.2654  0.4415 
ED2329    0  1  0.06024  0.2379 
AGE2534   0 1 0.2337  0.4232 
AGE3544   0 1 0.2128  0.4093 
AGE4554   0 1 0.1512  0.3582 
AGE5564   0 1 0.1258  0.3316 
AGE65UP    0 1 0.1098  0.3127 
CHURCH   0 1 0.2221  0.4156 
GOD    0  1  0.3294  0.47 
MEM12    0  8  0.1451  0.4964 
MEM3    0  8  0.1988  0.6717 
NOCHEAT    0 1 0.546  0.4979 
TRUST    0  1  0.3444  0.4752 
INCREL  0.1  1  0.5001  0.2522 
INCRELSQ   0.01  1  0.3137  0.2756 
LINCNAT   -3.34  0.0  -1.1563  0.8849 
INCNATSQ   0  1.0 0.3137  0.2756 
TRUSTNAT   0.05 0.71 0.3443  0.1415 
GOVTOT   -1  1.72  0.6483  0.7671 
NOCHEATN   0.05 0.81 0.5356  0.1612 
CHURCHN   0  0.9 0.243  0.2214 
MEMN12   0 0.81  0.1596  0.1627 
MEMN3  0  1.60  0.2030  0.3726 
WAVE2                  0  1  0.4721  0.4992 
WAVE3    0  1  0.3561  0.4789 
FSU    0  1  0.1672  0.3732 
EASTEUR    0 1 0.09512  0.2934 
LATAM    0  1  0.1137  0.3174 
ASIA    0  1  0.1011  0.3014 
OTHDEV   0 1 0.07061  0.2562 
SCAN    0  1  0.09774  0.297 
 
 
Number of observations: 87806 
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Equation 1: Well-Being Explained by Individual Variables 
 
Coefficients t  Sig. 
B Std.  Error 
(Constant)  7.384 0.045 163.523  0 
state of health  -0.615  0.008  -74.601  0 
UNEMP   -0.609  0.031  -19.497  0 
MARRIED  0.418 0.022 18.962  0 
ASMARR  0.25  0.036 7.048 0 
DIVORCED -0.0269  0.041  -0.657  0.511 
SEPAR   -0.317  0.057  -5.56  0 
WIDOWED  0.00405  0.037 0.109 0.913 
ED1619    -0.0480  0.018  -2.66  0.008 
ED2022         -0.0602  0.02  -2.961  0.003 
ED2329        0.06219 0.033  1.858  0.063 
AGE2534  -0.178 0.025  -7.244 0 
AGE3544 -0.332  0.027  -12.296  0 
AGE4554 -0.305  0.029  -10.415  0 
AGE5564 -0.0780  0.031  -2.521  0.012 
AGE65UP  0.237 0.034 7.018 0 
CHURCH  0.104 0.019 5.544 0 
GOD   0.34  0.018 19.283  0 
MEM12    0.05226  0.014 3.606 0 
MEM3    0.128 0.012 10.988  0 
NOCHEAT  0.255 0.014 17.638  0 
TRUST    0.257 0.015 16.859  0 
INCREL    1.889  0.119  15.809  0 
INCRELSQ -0.89  0.108  -8.262  0 
WAVE2    0.261 0.022 12.07 0 
WAVE3    -0.158 0.026  -6.179 0 
FSU   -1.649  0.025  -66.293  0 
EASTEUR -0.748  0.027  -27.709  0 
LATAM   -0.0015  0.027  -0.056  0.955 
ASIA   -0.346  0.027 -13.058  0 
OTHDEV -0.741  0.031  -23.539  0 
SCAN    0.528 0.026 20.13 0 
 
Model Summary 
R Sq  Adj R Square  Std. Error of the Estimate 
0.255 0.255   2.05 
 
 
Dependent variable: Life satisfaction, on a scale of 1 to 10.  
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Equation 2: Well-Being Explained by Individual and Societal Variables 
 
Coefficients t  Sig. 
B Std.  Error 
(Constant)  6.965 0.077 90.10 0 
state of health  -0.608  0.008  -73.92  0 
UNEMP    -0.587 0.031  -18.84 0 
MARRIED  0.429 0.022 19.56 0 
ASMARR  0.238 0.035 6.71  0 
DIVORCED -0.049  0.041  -1.23  0.229 
SEPAR   -0.355  0.057  -6.26  0 
WIDOWED  0.013 0.037 0.15  0.714 
ED1619    -0.691  0.018  -3.74  0 
ED2022    -0.660  0.021  -3.20  0.001 
ED2329    0.0967  0.034  2.87  0.004 
AGE2534 -0.193  0.024  -7.88  0 
AGE3544  -0.350 0.027  -13.03 0 
AGE4554  -0.333 0.029  -11.44 0 
AGE5564 -0.0993  0.031  -3.22  0.001 
AGE65UP  0.192 0.034 5.57  0 
CHURCH  0.144  0.02 7.37 0 
GOD   0.373 0.018 20.95 0 
MEM12   0.0330  0.015  2.29  0.026 
MEM3   0.0636 0.012  5.15  0 
NOCHEAT  0.225 0.015 15.49 0 
TRUST    0.240 0.015 15.87 0 
INCREL    1.903 0.12  15.87 0 
INCRELSQ -0.955  0.108  -8.82  0 
LINCNAT  0.265 0.025 15.87 0 
INCNATSQ -0.773  0.090  -8.54  0 
TRUSTNAT  0.319 0.112 2.84  0.005 
GOVTOT  0.317 0.026 12.03 0 
NOCHEATN  0.263 0.061 4.29  0 
CHURCHN  0.161 0.054 3.01  0.003 
MEMN12  0.578 0.076 7.57  0 
MEMN3  0.576 0.038 14.98 0 
EDATTNAT 0.0051  0.007  0.71 0.474 
WAVE2    0.215 0.025 8.73  0 
WAVE3   -0.280  0.040  -7.08  0 
FSU    -0.815 0.058  -13.98 0 
EASTEUR  -0.465 0.045  -10.44 0 
LATAM    0.322 0.041 7.92  0 
ASIA   -0.054  0.045 1.21  0.226 
OTHDEV -0.124  0.052  -2.39  0 
SCAN    0.445 0.040 11.10 0 
 
Model Summary 
R Sq  Adj R Square  Std. Error of the Estimate 
0.263 0.263   2.04 
Dependent variable: Life satisfaction, on a scale of 1 to 10.  
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Equation 3: Individual and National Effects of Education on Well-Being 
Coefficients t  Sig. 
B Std.  Error 
(Constant) 6.51  0.044  146.635  0 
ED1619      0.119 0.019 6.403 0 
ED2022    0.242  0.02  11.951  0 
ED2329    0.425  0.034  12.335  0 
EDATTNAT  0.06778  0.004 16.57 0 
WAVE2    0.202 0.022 8.959 0 
WAVE3    -0.163 0.026  -6.402 0 
FSU   -2.389  0.024  -98.745  0 
EASTEUR -1.154  0.028  -41.216  0 
LATAM    0.117 0.032 3.702 0 
ASIA    -0.275 0.031  -8.946 0 
OTHDEV  -0.319 0.04  -7.975 0 
SCAN    0.592 0.027 22.027  0 
 
Model Summary 
R Sq  Adj R Square  Std. Error of the Estimate 
0.161 0.161   2.17 
 
Dependent variable: Life satisfaction, on a scale of 1 to 10.  
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Equation 4: Effects of Education Including All Individual Variables 
 
Coefficients t  Sig. 
B Std.  Error 
 
(Constant) 6.981  .058  119.509  .000 
state of health  -.612  .008  -74.205  .000 
UNEMP   -.606  .031  -19.417  .000 
MARRIED  .415 .022 18.864  .000 
ASMARR  .234 .036 6.576  .000 
DIVORCED  -.0518 .041  -1.262 .207 
SEPAR   -.333  .057  -5.848  .000 
WIDOWED -.00342  .037  -.092  .927 
ED1619    -.0881 .018  -4.790 .000 
ED2022    -.0903 .021  -4.400 .000 
ED2329    .0517 .033  1.545 .122 
AGE2534 -.186  .025  -7.568  .000 
AGE3544 -.343  .027  -12.727  .000 
AGE4554 -.321  .029  -10.974  .000 
AGE5564 -.101  .031  -3.259  .001 
AGE65UP  .197 .034 5.801  .000 
CHURCH  .130 .019 6.877  .000 
GOD    .339 .018 19.223  .000 
MEM12    .0481 .014  3.321 .001 
MEM3    .123 .012 10.545  .000 
NOCHEAT  .251 .014 17.359  .000 
TRUST    .247 .015 16.205  .000 
INCREL 1.967  .120  16.449  .000 
INCRELSQ -.998  .108  -9.237  .000 
EDATTNAT .0434  .004 10.866  .000 
WAVE2    .263 .022 12.149  .000 
WAVE3   -.182  .026  -7.116  .000 
FSU   -1.634  .025 -65.596  .000 
EASTEUR -.723  .027  -26.682  .000 
LATAM    .170 .031 5.503  .000 
ASIA   -.198  .030  -6.656  .000 
OTHDEV -.496  .039  -12.840  .000 
SCAN    .551 .026 20.956  .000 
 
Model Summary 
R Sq  Adj R Square  Std. Error of the Estimate 
0.256 0.256   2.04 
 
Dependent variable: Life satisfaction, on a scale of 1 to 10.  
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Equation 5: Estimated by survey ordered probit with robust standard errors
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Well-being | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
ill-health | -.3098529 .011971 -25.88 0.000 -.3339221 -.2857836
unemoecd | -.3264395 .0357645 -9.13 0.000 -.3983488 -.2545302
unemrest | -.255049 .0630927 -4.04 0.000 -.3819054 -.1281927
married | .2193904 .017063 12.86 0.000 .1850829 .253698
asmarr | .1500514 .0316425 4.74 0.000 .0864299 .2136728
divorced | -.0280857 .0227729 -1.23 0.223 -.0738737 .0177023
separ | -.1313658 .0418161 -3.14 0.003 -.2154426 -.047289
age2534 | -.0878339 .013226 -6.64 0.000 -.1144266 -.0612412
age3544 | -.160897 .0152974 -10.52 0.000 -.1916544 -.1301396
age4554 | -.1365462 .014558 -9.38 0.000 -.1658171 -.1072754
age65up | .1437093 .0265991 5.40 0.000 .0902282 .1971905
church | .0633395 .022735 2.79 0.008 .0176278 .1090512
god | .2448375 .0260924 9.38 0.000 .1923753 .2972998
memtot | .0320677 .0097842 3.28 0.002 .0123954 .0517401
nocheat | .1345062 .0180847 7.44 0.000 .0981445 .1708679
trust | .1206647 .0128723 9.37 0.000 .0947832 .1465463
dec4oecd | .0752419 .0282683 2.66 0.011 .0184046 .1320792
dec5oecd | .1134835 .0248328 4.57 0.000 .0635537 .1634132
dec6oecd | .1197484 .035544 3.37 0.001 .0482823 .1912144
dec7oecd | .1098875 .031298 3.51 0.001 .0469586 .1728165
dec8oecd | .1143382 .0334174 3.42 0.001 .0471481 .1815283
dec9oecd | .0995473 .036428 2.73 0.009 .0263039 .1727907
d10oecd | .1727459 .0692726 2.49 0.016 .033464 .3120278
dec3rest | .1474467 .03297 4.47 0.000 .0811561 .2137374
dec4rest | .210999 .0405087 5.21 0.000 .1295509 .2924471
dec5rest | .2757988 .0472885 5.83 0.000 .1807189 .3708787
dec6rest | .2956818 .0509826 5.80 0.000 .1931745 .3981891
dec7rest | .403393 .056085 7.19 0.000 .2906266 .5161595
dec8rest | .4346364 .0600677 7.24 0.000 .3138623 .5554105
dec9rest | .4726356 .0578563 8.17 0.000 .3563077 .5889635
d10rest | .573604 .0730342 7.85 0.000 .426759 .720449
y2050 | .0911829 .0832137 1.10 0.279 -.0761295 .2584953
y5075 | .0480333 .1065739 0.45 0.654 -.1662478 .2623144
yover75 | .0105645 .1051811 0.10 0.920 -.2009163 .2220453
govtot | .2350489 .0575888 4.08 0.000 .1192589 .3508388
memntot | .232473 .0952784 2.44 0.018 .0409029 .424043
wave3 | -.2074443 .0539673 -3.84 0.000 -.3159529 -.0989358
fsu2 | -.3307758 .0714761 -4.63 0.000 -.4744882 -.1870634
fsu3 | -.5388172 .0805434 -6.69 0.000 -.7007606 -.3768737
easteur2 | -.4238132 .0783556 -5.41 0.000 -.5813577 -.2662686
scan | .2144182 .0554557 3.87 0.000 .1029169 .3259194
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
/cut1 | -2.258001 .1180448 -19.13 0.000 -2.495346 -2.020656
/cut2 | -2.005684 .1087071 -18.45 0.000 -2.224254 -1.787114
/cut3 | -1.619015 .0969314 -16.70 0.000 -1.813909 -1.424121
/cut4 | -1.31311 .0918048 -14.30 0.000 -1.497696 -1.128524
/cut5 | -.779954 .0870779 -8.96 0.000 -.9550359 -.6048721
/cut6 | -.4315701 .0882769 -4.89 0.000 -.6090627 -.2540774
/cut7 | .0083922 .0883394 0.09 0.925 -.169226 .1860105
/cut8 | .6670761 .0864617 7.72 0.000 .4932332 .840919
/cut9 | 1.159699 .0917754 12.64 0.000 .9751721 1.344226